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Introduction 
Circumvention tools allow users to bypass Internet filtering to access content otherwise blocked by 
governments, workplaces, schools, or even the blocked sites themselves.  There are a number of 
different types of these tools: blocking-resistant tools, simple web proxies, virtual private network 
(VPN) services, and open HTTP/SOCKS proxies.  But every type of circumvention tool provides the 
same basic functionality – proxying user connections to provide access to otherwise blocked sites.  In 
the following report, we use a variety of methods to evaluate the usage of the first three of these four 
types of tools to test two hypotheses.  First, even though much of the media attention on circumvention 
tools has been given to a handful of tools – notably Freegate, Ultrasurf, Tor, and Hotspot Shield – we 
find that these tools represent only a small portion of overall circumvention usage and that the attention 
paid to these tools has been disproportionate to their usage, especially when compared to the more 
widely used simple web proxies.
1  Second, even when including the more widely-used simple web 
proxies, we find that overall usage of circumvention tools is still very small in proportion to the number 
of Internet users in countries with substantial national Internet filtering.   
Key Findings 
•  We estimate that no more than 3% of Internet users in countries that engage in substantial 
filtering use circumvention tools.  The actual number is likely considerably less. 
•  Many more users use simple web proxies than use either blocking-resistant tools or VPN 
services.  Of the 11 tools with at least 250,000 unique monthly monthly users, 3 are blocking-
resistant tools, 1 is a VPN service, and 7 are simple web proxies.  
•  When users search for proxy and circumvention related terms in filtering countries, they 
overwhelmingly search for generic proxy terms like “proxy,” and those terms overwhelmingly 
return either simple web proxies or sites that list simple web proxies and HTTP/SOCKS 
proxies, not more sophisticated tools. 
Circumvention Tool Types 
The OpenNet Initiative has documented network filtering of the Internet by national governments in 
over forty countries worldwide.
2  Countries use this network filtering as one of many methods to 
                                                 
1  We used google to search nytimes.com (eg. [site:nytimes.com freegate]) for mentions of the ten most popular 
circumvention tools (as documented in the body of this paper) and found the following number of mentions for the 
following terms: Freegate: 17, Ultrasurf: 3, Global Internet Freedom Consortium (which includes both Freegate and 
Ultrasurf): 15, Tor project: 8, Hotspot Shield: 7.  The other six tools in the set of ten most used circumvention tools are 
all simple web proxies – the six combined received only one mention on nytimes.com.. 
2   See the country reports, available for free online, at http://opennet.net.  For a book-length treatment of this topic, see 3 
control the flow of online content that is objectionable to the filtering governments for social, political, 
and security reasons. Filtering is particularly appealing to governments as it allows them to control 
content not published within their national borders.  In addition to national Internet filtering by 
governments, many schools and businesses filter their local connections to the Internet.  Many web 
sites even filter their own content by the geographic location their users – for example, television 
streaming site hulu.com blocks all users outside of the U.S. from accessing its content. 
All circumvention tools use the same basic method to bypass this sort of network filtering: they proxy 
connections through third party sites that are not filtered themselves.  By using this method, a user in 
China who cannot reach http://falundafa.org directly can instead access a proxy machine like 
http://superproxy.com/, which can fetch http://falundafa.org for the user.  The network filter only sees a 
connection to the proxy machine (superproxy.com), and so as long as the proxy itself remains 
unfiltered, the user can visit sites through the proxy that are otherwise blocked by the network filter.  
Some, but not all, tools also encrypt traffic between the user and proxy, both so that the traffic between 
the user and proxy is much more difficult to monitor and so, that filtering triggered by the content of 
the traffic (instead of merely the destination of the traffic) will not work. 
Despite this core similarity, circumvention tools differ significantly in many implementation details.  
We break circumvention tools into four large categories based on their proxy implementations.  Each 
category of tool is distinguished from one another also by virtue of each being closely associated with a 
single model of financial support.  The four categories of tools are: 
•  blocking-resistant tools 
•  simple web proxies 
•  VPN services 
•  HTTP/SOCKS proxies 
The defining characteristic of blocking-resistant tools is that they implement sophisticated methods for 
evading blocking by filters.  A core problem for all circumvention tools is that proxy sites can be 
blocked just as content and other sites.  China can block superproxy.com as well as falundafa.org, and 
then proxy requests through superproxy.com will cease working.  Some tools in each of the above 
categories use simple forms of blocking resistance to avoid this sort of filtering—for example, a simple 
web proxy might maintain a list of alternative domain names to send to users in the case that one or 
more of its existing domain names is blocked.  The tools we classify as blocking-resistant tools 
distinguish themselves from the other categories of tools by implementing much more sophisticated 
technical means of blocking resistance.
3   
                                                                                                                                                                        
Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain, eds., Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, 
Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace (MIT Press, 2010). 
3  All of these tools use the same basic method for remaining unblocked.  In addition to a core of powerful proxy machines 
that transit and accelerate proxy traffic, these tools maintain a large pool of “disposable” front end proxies whose only 
job is to proxy traffic back to the core proxies.  These blocking-resistant tools are able to cycle quickly through large 
numbers of these front end proxies as they are blocked by filtering countries, so that the user is ideally always able to 4 
All of the tools in this category also require installation of a downloaded, client-side application but use 
the native interface of the browser for web access, unlike the simple web proxies described below.  We 
include only a handful of tools in this category: Freegate, Ultrasurf, and Tor.  All of the tools in this 
category are supported primarily by governmental or charitable funding.  Freegate and Ultrasurf are 
part of the Global Internet Freedom Consortium (GIFC), a Falun Gong-associated group, and are 
expressly aimed at allowing Chinese people to bypass Chinese government filtering to access political 
content (though users in other countries use the GIFC tools as well).  Tor was initially developed as an 
anonymity tool but is also effective as a circumvention tool. 
Simple web proxies are server-side applications accessed through web page forms. To use one of these 
tools, the user simply visits a web page that includes a form with a url input box.  Instead of entering a 
web page url into the browser address bar, the user enters the address into the web page form.  By 
submitting this web page form, the user sends the url request to the proxy web server, and the web 
server returns the page via the proxy.  Simple web proxies do not require the user to download or install 
any client-side application.  To use the tool the user needs only visit the web page hosting the proxying 
web application (for instance http://superproxy.com).  Simple web proxies do require, however, that the 
user navigate the separate, form based browsing interface. 
Almost all of these tools support themselves by hosting ads, on either or both of the initial landing page 
and the banners inserted onto the top of proxied web pages. Some tools go a step further and attempt to 
replace ads on the requested page with their own ads. Simple web proxies were initially targeted at 
students in the U.S. and other countries to bypass school filtering systems, but they use the same basic 
proxying methods as the blocking-resistant tools and so also serve to bypass national filters as long as a 
given proxy is not specifically blocked by a given country.  Some simple proxies have been optimized 
for usage in countries where the Internet is filtered by the government. At least one widely used proxy 
site markets itself to users from a specific country, who seek access to YouTube, which is blocked by 
their government.  The only blocking resistance features often used by these tools disguise the proxying 
functionality of the site, so unlike the blocking-resistant tools, they are most commonly defenseless in 
the face of IP-based proxy blocking. Some simple proxies register closely related domain names in 
anticipation of being blocked, and many of their users know that if 1superproxy.com ceases to work in 
their country, they might try 2superproxy.com. 
VPN services use virtual private network software to encrypt and tunnel all Internet traffic through a 
proxy machine.  VPN technology has traditionally been used to allow corporate and other institutional 
users to access internal networks from the public network, but in the past few years there has been 
tremendous growth in the availability of personal VPN services.  Among other uses, these personal 
VPN services act as circumvention tools as long as the VPN proxy is hosted outside a filtering country.  
VPN services might or might not require installation of client-side software (many rely on existing 
VPN support in Windows or Mac OSX and so need no extra client software) and allow the user to 
access the web directly through the native browser interface.  Because VPN services tunnel all Internet 
traffic, they can be used for email, chat, and any other Internet service in addition to web browsing.  
Almost all of these tools support themselves through fees charged directly to users (charges of $10 to 
$30 per month are common), though a few also offer free services with restricted bandwidth.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                        
reach some front end proxy that has not yet been blocked.  The front end proxies are often provided by volunteer 
communities, which makes them not only cheaper to operate but more difficult to discover and block since the 
volunteers have IP addresses randomly distributed across many Internet service providers. 5 
exception to this business model is Hotspot Shield, overwhelmingly the most popular VPN service, 
which supports itself by injecting ads into the top of all web pages served through its service. VPN 
services can be blocked either by blocking the IP address they use, or by blocking the protocols used to 
set up VPN connections. However, since VPNs are often used by business users to access corporate 
intranets, many governments are reluctant to block the traffic. 
The largest class of circumvention tools by number of proxies includes HTTP and SOCKS proxies.  
These are application level proxies that funnel network traffic through protocols designed to allow web 
traffic to pass through firewalls.
4  Users generally find lists of these proxies in the form of IP addresses 
and port numbers on proxy directory web sites.  To use a given HTTP or SOCKS proxy, the user enters 
the IP address and port number of the proxy into a configuration screen of the browser.  As a result, no 
client-side application is needed.  The user is able to use the native interface of the browser.  These 
proxies are generally open to the public and have no apparent source of funding (users do not pay to 
subscribe to them, and the owners of the proxies are anonymous so there is no way to know if they are 
receiving charitable or government funding).  
There are many thousands of these proxies listed on dozens of proxy directory sites, but they turn over 
very quickly, so the user has to search actively for new proxies to find working ones.  With the other 
three types of tools, it is frequently possible, though often difficult, to discover who is operating a 
proxy service.  With HTTP/SOCKS proxies, it is almost impossible to discover who is running a given 
proxy, which makes it problematic for many users to place trust in these proxies.  Even though it is 
unlikely that a Chinese government agent or another filtering government is running most of these 
HTTP/SOCKS proxies, it would be surprising if a Chinese government agent were not running at least 
some of them given the extreme ease of setting one up.  And it is certain that many of these 
HTTP/SOCKS proxies are run on machines without the knowledge of their owners, for example as 
botnet proxies.
5 
Research Methodologies and Proxy Usage Estimates 
We use three main methods for measuring the usage of circumvention tools – a survey that we 
conducted, with 134 respondents self-reporting usage numbers on their project or services; analysis of 
data derived from automated methods regarding web site visits (Google AdPlanner); and analysis of 
data collected regarded search term frequency (Google Insights).  For the blocking-resistant tools and 
the VPN services, we rely primarily on self-reporting from our survey, since the individual 
circumvention projects themselves are the only ones with the necessary data about their users.  For the 
simple web proxies, we are able to use Google AdPlanner's data on generic web site visits to measure 
usage of each tool because each use of a web proxy is also a web page request in itself.  We use search 
frequency as reported by Google Insights as a separate point of reference and confirmation for these 
other methods.  We have no method for measuring the usage of HTTP/SOCKS proxies, since they 
cannot be measured as generic web site visits and are almost always hosted anonymously. 
                                                 
4  HTTP is the protocol used by web browsers and web servers to exchange content.  HTTP includes in its specification a 
proxying protocol that allows web browsers and servers to talk to one another through a proxy.  The SOCKS protocol is 
a generic protocol for proxying TCP/IP traffic.  Unlike a VPN service, which requires no configuration for individual 
applications like web browsers, using a SOCKS proxy requires that each application be configured individually to use 
the proxy. 
5  Threat Matrix.  “Botnet proxies hide the bad guy.”  <http://threatmetrix.com/resource-center/articles/botnet-proxies-
hide-the-bad-guy/> 6 
Measuring usage of circumvention tools is inherently difficult because the purpose of these tools is to 
obscure the identity of the person who is visiting any given site or sites.  The general difficulty of 
measuring any sort of network usage compounds this difficulty: Is a unique user defined as a unique IP 
address?  A persistent cookie?  How can unique users over the course of a day be translated into unique 
users over the course of a month or a longer period?  The problem is further complicated by the need to 
rely on self reporting for many of the tools, where we have to rely on both the honesty and the 
competence of each individual tool to measure its own usage.  Our goal therefore is not to discover 
precise levels of usage but instead to find the right orders of magnitude for the usage of individual tools 
and of classes of tools. 
Blocking-Resistant Tool Usage Estimates 
We collected the following self reports of usage from Freegate, Ultrasurf, and Tor: 
Tool  Unique Users 
Freegate + Ultrasurf  500,000 – 1,000,000 monthly 
Tor  100,000 – 300,000 daily 
 
The Freegate and Ultrasurf figures represent a combined report for both tools from the developers of 
the projects based on the combined unique IP addresses connecting to the services over the course of a 
single month.  As with all reports of unique IP addresses, this number likely overstates the number of 
unique users over a month as many users of DSL and cable modems use dynamically assigned IP 
addresses that change over the course of a month.  For Tor, the usage number is drawn from a 2009 
report on usage from the project based on reports from the projects' directory services.
6  Because Tor 
does not maintain central servers, as Ultrareach and Freegate do, it is not possible to determine how 
many people are accessing the system – it is possible, however, to see how many unique IP addresses 
access the directory of Tor entry nodes. 
Both of these numbers fluctuate weekly and even daily depending on how aggressively filtering 
countries, especially China, are blocking these tools.  In mid-2010, China was attempting to block these 
specific tools much more aggressively, and so the usage of each tool was likely nearer the bottom than 
the top of the estimate range (Chinese users represent a major but not the only source of users for both 
tools as evidenced by self reports by both projects that successful blocking attempts by China result in 
significant drops in overall usage).  Note that the Tor number is a daily number, and it is unclear how to 
translate the number directly to monthly users.  However, we think it is likely that the two usage 
estimates are within the same order of magnitude.  We make the relatively safe assumption that not 
every Tor user uses the site daily, and that a monthly usage number is a multiple of the daily usage. 
It is possible that there is some overlap in the user base of Tor and Freegate/Ultrasurf tools, as Tor has 
reported significant interest in their tool from China, and Freegate and Ultrasurf, originally designed for 
usage in China, now report usage in Iran.  That possible overlap suggests usage of blocking-resistant 
proxy tools may be lower than the monthly and daily users the sites collectively report, but we can 
                                                 
6  Loesing, Karsten.  “Measuring the Tor Network: Evaluation of Client Requests to the Directories.” June 25, 2009.  
<http://metrics.torproject.org/papers/directory-requests-2009-06-25.pdf> 7 
estimate a maximum usage of combined users of the tools by assuming no overlap between them.  
Assuming no overlap and a very rough conversion of 3 monthly users for each daily user, we estimate 
the total number of unique monthly users for Freegate/Ultrasurf and Tor as between 800,000 and 
1,900,000. 
Simple Web Proxy Usage Estimates 
To estimate the usage of simple web proxies, we first built a crawler to find as many proxies as 
possible.  The crawler accessed a list of proxy directory sites, recording any links to simple web 
proxies found on those sites.  To include proxy directories and proxies from a range of different 
countries, we seeded the crawler with the top ten proxy-related Google search results of the most 
common proxy related search term (as described below in the Search Frequency section) for each of 
the following countries: China, Russia, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, Burma, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan.
7  For each search result, we either included the proxy directly if the result was itself a 
simple web proxy or included all of the proxies listed by the directory if the result was a proxy 
directory. 
We ran the crawler daily for three months from February to May of 2010, collecting any new proxies 
on the identified proxy directories over that period.  During this period, we found a total of 11,350 
simple web proxies.  We think this significantly undercounts the total number of simple web proxies 
advertised during this period, since we have no reason to believe that our list of proxy directories was 
comprehensive or that every simple web proxy is listed in a proxy directory.
8  However, we assume that 
the most popular simple web proxies will be advertised across several proxy directories, so we are less 
likely to miss the biggest proxies.  
We took each of those proxies and retrieved the unique monthly users from Google AdPlanner for each.  
Google AdPlanner uses a variety of data sources to estimate unique visitors to any web site domain, 
including google.com searches, Google toolbar data, Google Analytics data, consumer panels, and third 
party market research data.
9  Because each proxied request through a simple web proxy is itself a 
request for a web page, these web traffic data accurately reflect the usage of simple web proxies to the 
degree that the web traffic estimates are accurate.  These AdPlanner estimates are based on Google's 
vast trove of data about web traffic, and so we view them to be as accurate as any third party estimate 
of web traffic. 
The data from Google that we use to measure usage is the AdPlanner estimate of unique monthly users 
for each web site.  Google uses unique cookies as the basis for this user estimate, but it adjusts the 
unique cookie number down to recognize the fact that cookies do not directly correspond to users (the 
same user often uses multiple computers with different cookies, for instance).  Any cookie based 
estimate is likely to be smaller than an IP-address-based estimate of users, since IP addresses change 
more frequently than cookies.  Thus, AdPlanner's estimate of monthly users is less than a cookie-based 
                                                 
7  This list of countries was chosen to be a geographically diverse set of countries that implement some level of filtering on 
their national networks. 
8  We did not include http://proxy.org in our crawling because they specifically requested that we not crawl their site.  
Proxy.org alone lists up to 9,000 simple web proxies a day in its service, an indication that we have undercounted the 
total number of simple web proxies. 
9  Google.  “How Doubleclick Ad Planner data is generated.”  2010. 
<http://www.google.com/support/adplanner/bin/answer.py?answer=98132> 8 
estimate, which is likely to be less than an IP address-based estimate. 
Of the 11,350 proxies found by the crawler, AdPlanner returned web traffic data for only 183 of them. 
We believe this is because only 183 proxies meet Google's minimum requirements for “significant 
traffic.”  Google does not disclose its minimum threshold for “significant traffic,” but the lowest 
number of unique users returned for any site we submitted to AdPlanner was 3300 users.  We therefore 
assume that the threshold is around 3300 users.  After the three month crawler run completed, we 
manually tested 50 proxy urls chosen randomly from the proxies for which AdPlanner returned no data.  
Of the 50 tested proxies, 40 were no longer valid proxies.  This is not an unexpected result, since proxy 
operators frequently churn through proxy urls as proxies get blocked, become unprofitable, lose interest 
for the operator, and so on.  We assume that the remainder of the estimated 20% of proxies that were 
working proxies but returned no data from adwords had less than 3300 users per month. 
From the 183 proxies for which AdPlanner returned data, the ten with the most unique users are below.  
We have replaced the names of the proxies with numbers to avoid creating a roadmap for organizations 
that would filter these proxies. 
Simple Web Proxy  Unique Monthly Users 
SWP 1  1,100,000 
SWP 2  840,000 
SWP 3  760,000 
SWP 4  520,000 
SWP 5  430,000 
SWP 6  390,000 
SWP 7  270,000 
SWP 8  220,000 
SWP 9  180,000 
SWP 10  150,000 
 
Including the proxies above, we found 15 simple web proxies with at least 100,000 unique monthly 
users.  The average number of unique monthly users for the 183 proxies was 49,620, and the median 
was 14,000.  The total of all users from all 183 proxies is 9,080,400, but that total over counts the total 
number of estimated unique users of simple web proxies because the users are only unique for each 
proxy (the same user may use a number of different simple web proxies, and we have no way of 
measuring the degree to which proxies share users). 
In aggregate, our method suggests an estimated user base for simple web proxies of between 10-15 
million. In aggregate, we believe usage of simple web proxies is at least an order of magnitude larger 
than use of blocking-resistant proxy tools but is still a very small portion of all Internet users. 
VPN Service Usage Estimates 9 
To estimate the usage of VPN services, we spent over a hundred hours searching the Internet for 
advertised VPN services and then surveyed each of the services for their daily and monthly usage 
numbers.  We also recorded various characteristics of each VPN, including the date of creation and the 
funding model.  In total, we found 134 VPN services.  Even though we took considerable effort to 
exhaust the search, it is certain that we missed some services.  In particular, the search for VPN 
services was done by an English speaking researcher and so focused on English language advertised 
services (even though we found a number of foreign language-based services through the search).  It is 
possible that we missed a significant number of foreign language based services through this method. 
Of those 134 VPN services, 90 have been created in the past three years according to their domain 
creation dates.  Almost all of the services charge a subscription fee.  Hotspot Shield, by far the most 
popular VPN service we found, is the exception to this rule— it is free and supports itself by injecting 
ads into all web pages retrieved over its network.  We found three other free VPN services: one that is 
ad supported like Hotspot Shield (but the subject of many reports of poor reliability and even spam 
campaigns aimed at its users), one that claims to be in a beta period for testing, and one that is run by a 
company that sells filtering software.
10  We found five other services that offer a free version with 
limited bandwidth as an alternative to their subscription-based service.  Many sites offer free services 
that are hobbled in more serious ways, for example, many are either limited to a trial duration of a few 
days or requiring reconnection to the network every five to twenty minutes. 
We sent an email survey to each of the 134 services and received responses from 21, a 15.7% response 
rate.  Many of the responses returned usage data in a form other than daily or monthly unique users, 
requiring us to use very crude conversions to estimate the order of magnitude of the usage for each 
tool.  Daily usage was the statistic most commonly reported, so we applied a rough conversion from 
monthly unique users to daily unique users for sites that only reported only monthly users.  Several 
sites reported both daily and monthly usage, which allowed us to establish a 3:1 ratio for monthly:daily 
traffic statistics.  Some respondents reported non-unique daily users.  Based on respondents who 
reported both numbers, we assumed a ratio of 6 non-unique daily users to 1 unique daily user.   Some 
respondents reported only concurrent users.  Again, extrapolating from other responses, we assumed a 
ration of 1 concurrent user to 4 daily unique users. 
Hotspot Shield did not respond to this survey but previously reported their usage as 600,000 unique 
users per month.  We do not include Hotspot Shield in the aggregate survey results below because we 
consider them to be an outlier among VPN services, both because of their usage and because of their  
unique status as a viable, reliable, free VPN service. 
Based on the self reports from the survey and on the rough conversions described above, we estimate 
that the 22 responding VPN services had a mean of 3909 unique daily users and a median of 1667 
unique daily users.  Of the 22 respondents, only 3 had at least 10,000 users (their numbers were 10,500; 
12,300; and 30,000).  If we add together the unique users of each tool, we find only 82,089 unique 
daily users among the responding VPN services, excluding Hotspot Shield.  If we assume that the 
responding VPN services are representative of the whole pool of 134 services, the 134 services would 
total approximately 500,000 unique daily users. Given the cost associated with subscribing to a VPN 
service, it is unlikely there is much overlap between users of VPN services, as we expect to find among 
                                                 
10 We leave as an exercise for the reader deciphering the considerable value for a filtering company of running its own 
circumvention system. 10 
users of simple web proxies. 
It is possible that the 21 responding VPN services are significantly smaller than the population of 134 
VPN services (and of the larger population of all existing VPN services) or that VPN services with very 
large user bases were not among the respondents.  To test whether the 21 responding VPN services 
under-represent large VPN services, we compared the Google search frequency for the domain of each 
of the 134 VPN services with the search frequency for the term “hotspotshield” (see below for further 
details about the search frequency method).  So, for instance, for a hypothetical VPN service with a 
domain name of “supervpn.com,” we compared the frequency of searches for “hotspotshield” to those 
for “supervpn.”  We found only 11 VPN services whose name had a search frequency of at least 1/80 
the size of search frequency for “hotspotshield.”  Of those 11, only two had a search frequency greater 
than 1/80: the free VPN service run by a filtering company had a search frequency of 2/80, and a VPN 
service sold by a company that also sells other more popular privacy software had a search frequency 
of 3/80.  Of the remaining 9 VPN services that registered a search frequency of 1/80, 4 were 
represented among the respondents of our survey.  This over-representation of respondents among the 
group of the most searched for VPN services provides some assurance that our survey responses do not 
under-represent large VPN services.  And the finding that the VPN service with the greatest search 
frequency other than Hotspot Shield had only 3/80 of the searches of Hotspot Shield is evidence that 
we have not missed any very large VPN services among the 134 services we found.  
Combining Hotspot Shield's reported numbers and our estimate above, assuming no overlap, and using 
the rough 1:3 conversion of daily to monthly users, we roughly estimate 2.1 million users of VPN 
services, the same order of magnitude as users of blocking-resistant proxy servers. 
HTTP/SOCKS Proxy Usage Estimates 
There are at least tens of thousands of open HTTP/SOCKS proxies advertised on various proxy 
directories, based on our incidental collections of such proxies through the crawler described above.  It 
is common for a single proxy directory to list thousands of such proxies at any given time.  But there is 
no reasonable way to reliably determine the usage of such tools.  The only way to directly measure 
usage is on the proxies themselves, and the vast majority of the proxies lack any contact information 
that could be used to survey usage.  One method of measuring the usage of the proxies would be to 
analyze the logs of a filtered websites from various countries and try to identify HTTP / SOCKS 
proxies among the connecting IP addresses, but we did not attempt this method because of the 
difficulty of obtaining a range of such highly sensitive logs and the difficulty of identifying HTTP / 
SOCKS proxy IP addresses with sufficient reliability. 
It is worth noting that HTTP/SOCKS proxies require more user knowledge and involvement than 
simple proxies. A user needs to edit her network settings to specify a proxy, and may need to change 
proxy settings frequently. Users in cybercafés and some other settings are often prevented from 
accessing a machine's network settings. Given these factors, we suspect HTTP/SOCKS proxies are 
used less often than simple proxies, but it would be very difficult to definitively confirm that suspicion. 
Search Frequency 
Google Insights provides data on the relative frequency of search terms globally and within specific 11 
countries.  An alternative method for testing the popularity of various circumvention tools and methods 
is to use Google Insights to determine the search frequency for related terms.  We tested the popularity 
of twenty circumvention related search terms in nine different countries (China, Russia, Iran, Egypt, 
Tunisia, Burma, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan), including both the English terms and the local 
language translations of each term.  We also collected euphemisms for filtering circumvention in each 
local language from local experts in each country and tested the popularity of those terms.   For 
example, experts reported to us that “climbing over the wall” is commonly used to search for tools to 
bypass the “great fire wall” in China. The tested terms included some of the most popular tools from 
each of the blocking-resistant, simple proxy, and VPN service tool types.   
We found that in every country except China and Iran, the most popular proxy-related search term by a 
large margin was the English language term “proxy.”  In China, the most popular search term was the 
direct Chinese translation of “proxy.”  In Iran, the most popular search term was the Farsi translation of 
“filter.” We combined the first ten search results from the most popular single search term in each of 
the nine countries.  This combined set consisted of 49 proxy directories, 33 sites unrelated to 
circumvention, 8 proxy listing blogs, 8 simple web proxies, and 2 redirectors to simple web proxies.  
The proxy directories overwhelmingly listed a combination of simple web proxies and HTTP/SOCKS 
proxies.  None of the results directly pointed to blocking-resistant tools or to VPN services. 
These results are not definitive.  Google searches are one of several discovery methods for 
circumvention tools, and they are also a reflection of general cultural awareness of a given term.  
Certainly in some countries Google searches for specific circumvention related terms are blocked or 
edited, and even where Google search results are not directly edited the sites of many tools are blocked, 
skewing the search results away from those blocked sites (and presumably decreasing the popularity of 
the fruitless searches).  But we think that these results provide further evidence for the finding that 
usage of simple web proxies is at least as large as, and probably considerably larger than, usage of the 
blocking-resistant tools. 
Conclusions 
Usage estimates for blocking-resistant tools and for simple web proxies suggest that simple web 
proxies are at least as popular as the blocking-resistant tools and are likely an order of magnitude more 
popular, in aggregate.  Of the 11 circumvention tools with at least 250,000 monthly users (Ultrasurf, 
Freegate, Tor, Hotspot Shield, and SWP #s 1 – 7), 7 are simple web proxies.  Those 7 proxies together 
appear to serve close to half of the combined unique users of the 183 simple web proxies whose usage 
we were able to estimate.  The number of subscription-based VPN services has more than tripled over 
the past three years, but the usage of these services, other than Hotspot Shield, is still a relatively small 
portion of circumvention tool users, totaling about as many users as the largest single blocking-resistant 
tool or simple web proxy.  Search frequency data further shows that searches for circumvention related 
topics is dominated by forms of the generic term “proxy” and that those searches overwhelmingly 
return simple web proxies or proxy directories dominated by simple web proxies and HTTP/SOCKS 
proxies. 
This result should not be interpreted to diminish the importance of blocking-resistant tools or VPN 
services. Tor provides an important anonymizing service as well as enabling circumvention of filtering, 
and Freegate, Ultrasurf and VPN systems allow users in nations that aggressively filter the Internet to 12 
obtain relatively uninterrupted connections to the Internet.  VPN services provide significantly more 
functionality than simple web proxies because they proxy the entire network connection.  But this 
result does suggest that scholars, advocates, and others need to take seriously the role simple web 
proxies play in enabling circumvention of Internet filtering.  
We were surprised to discover that several widely-used simple proxies remained unblocked for very 
long periods of time in highly censorious nations that aggressively block the more well-discussed 
blocking-resistant tools.  This difference in the treatment of the different types of tools may be the 
result of the difference in press coverage of these tools.  Unlike Freegate, Ultrasurf, and Tor, the more 
widely-used simple web proxies have not been lauded much if at all in the U.S. press as agents of 
political change.  One explanation for why the more widely used but less widely discussed tools have 
not been blocked as aggressively is that decisions about which tools to block are based more on 
political considerations (including both the politics of the projects themselves and the political slant of 
media coverage of the projects) than on technical considerations.  This hypothesis presents a difficult 
challenge for those hoping to support circumvention tools as agents of political chance, in particular for 
the U.S government, because any support by organizations or the U.S. government for these tools may 
have the side effect of increasing the efforts of filtering governments to block the supported tools. 
It would be unwise to assume that all the users we estimate are using simple proxies are located in 
nations that aggressively filter the Internet. We know from interviews with operators of ad-supported 
proxies that they target their sites towards students circumventing school firewalls and other users in 
nations with little or no national filtering. Field studies suggest that ad-supported proxies are often used 
to evade server-side geographic restrictions on otherwise uncontroversial content in countries that do 
not filter the Internet.  Users of blocking-resistant tools, on the other hand, are more likely to be located 
in countries with substantial filtering. 
Altogether, we find that, even given the large margin of error for our estimates, usage of all of the tools 
described here is very small compared to the total population of approximately 2 billion Internet users 
globally or even the population of users in countries that aggressively filter the Internet.  The OpenNet 
Initiative lists 13 countries as implementing “substantial” Internet filtering, blocking content for 
political, social or security reasons.
11  The estimated number of Internet users in those thirteen 
countries totals 562 million, and we would expect many of those users to turn to circumvention tools to 
access blocked parts of the Internet.
12  The top end of our estimates for blocking-resistant proxies, 
simple proxies and VPN services totals 19 million (1.9 million for blocking-resistant tools + 15 million 
for simple web proxies + 2.1 million for VPN services). 
If we assume no overlap between those tools and assume that they are only being used by citizens of 
the nations where filtering is most pervasive, only 3% of Internet users in these countries would be 
using blocking-resistant proxies, simple proxies, or VPN services.  We do not include HTTP/SOCKS 
proxies in that 3%, but the usage of HTTP/SOCKS proxies would have to be much higher than that of 
the other classes of tools to significantly raise the usage of circumvention tools, even including the 
various assumptions that overestimate usage, including especially the large number of users of these 
                                                 
11 Deibert et al., supra note 2. 
12   Internet usage statistics according to International Telecommunications Union, http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/icteye/Reporting/ShowReportFrame.aspx?ReportName=/WTI/InformationTechnologyPublic&ReportFormat=HTML4.0
&RP_intYear=2009&RP_intLanguageID=1&RP_bitLiveData=False [last accessed on September 22, 2010]. 13 
tools in countries without “substantial” filtering. 
The relatively small usage of circumvention tools, even in filtering countries, suggests either that users 
do not know that the tools exist, do not know how to find them, or consider that the benefits of using 
the tools do not outweigh the costs for most users.  The relative popularity of “proxy” searches 
documented in this paper indicates that at least some users are able to find them with simple search 
terms and that those search terms are unblocked (otherwise they would not be popular), but the high 
popularity of technical terms like “proxy” relative to other proxy related search terms might also mean 
that only technical users are aware of the tools.  Even if users are able to find the tools, it may be that 
some combination of the usability, performance, and security of the tools is not good enough that users 
find the benefit of circumventing filtering worth the cost of using the tools.  Even though we have 
found the usability of most of the tools to be adequate, any effort required to install and use the tools 
will dissuade some number of potential users.  Performance is likely to be a more significant problem.  
Performance tests from a 2007 evaluation of circumvention tools by some of the authors of this paper 
suggest that performance was a significant problem for all circumvention tools in 2007, and anecdotal 
experience suggests that it continues to be a problem.
13  The security properties of the tools has a very 
unclear effect on usage, since we have neither a sense of users' perceptions of the security risks of using 
the tools nor of users' perceptions of the security properties of particular tools.  Finally, it may be that 
there is just not as much interest in circumventing Internet filtering as widely believed for any of a 
number of reasons. For example, users in many filtering countries may simply prefer to access local 
content, written in their own languages about topics of local interest, despite the fact that the local 
content is subject to traditional government regulation and therefore highly censored.
14 We note that 
three of the nations that have at least tens of millions of Internet users and who aggressively filter the 
Internet – China, Iran and Vietnam – have made significant investments in creating locally hosted 
alternatives to popular social media platforms like YouTube and Facebook. Our findings may suggest 
the logic of this approach – a large percentage of users in nations that aggressively filter the Internet 
either do not know how to conveniently reach these popular sites, or they have decided to use censored, 
local alternatives. 
                                                 
13 Roberts, Hal et al.  2007 Circumvention Landscape Report: Methods, Uses, and Tools. Berkman Center for Internet & 
Society.  2009. <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2009/2007_Circumvention_Landscape_Report> 
14 For example, pending research by the authors of this paper shows that about 95% of web page visits in China are to web 
sites hosted within China, which may show that filtering has been extremely successful or simply that Chinese people 
like to read web sites written in Chinese by other Chinese people about topics of local interest to China. 